Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both adversarial and clean examples, is one of the most trusted defense methods against adversarial attacks. However, there are three major practical difficulties in implementing and deploying this method -expensive in terms of extra memory and computation costs; accuracy trade-off between clean and adversarial examples; and lack of diversity of adversarial perturbations. Classical adversarial training uses fixed, precomputed perturbations in adversarial examples (input space). In contrast, we introduce dynamic adversarial perturbations into the parameter space of the network, by adding perturbation biases to the fully connected layers of deep convolutional neural network. During training, using only clean images, the perturbation biases are updated in the Fast Gradient Sign Direction to automatically create and store adversarial perturbations by recycling the gradient information computed. The network learns and adjusts itself automatically to these learned adversarial perturbations. Thus, we can achieve adversarial training with negligible cost compared to requiring a training set of adversarial example images. In addition, if combined with classical adversarial training, our perturbation biases can alleviate accuracy trade-off difficulties, and diversify adversarial perturbations.
INTRODUCTION
Neural networks have lead to a series of breakthroughs in many fields, such as image classification tasks (He et al., 2016) , natural language processing (Devlin et al., 2018) . Model performance on clean examples was the main evaluation criterion for these applications until the realization of the adversarial example phenomenon by Szegedy et al. (2013) ; Biggio et al. (2013) . Neural networks were shown to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations: carefully computed small perturbations added to legitimate clean examples (adversarial examples, Fig. 1a ) can cause misclassification on state-of-the-art machine learning models. Thus, building a deep learning system that is robust to both adversarial examples and clean examples has emerged as a critical requirement.
Researchers have proposed a number of adversarial defense strategies to increase the robustness of a deep learning system. Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both adversarial examples (x adv ) and clean examples (x cln ) with true class labels y, is one of the few defenses against adversarial attacks that withstands strong attacks. Adversarial examples are the summation of adversarial perturbations lying inside the input space (δ I ) and clean examples: x adv = x cln + δ I (Fig. 1a) . Given a classifier with a classification loss function L and parameters θ, the objective function of adversarial training is: Despite the efficacy of adversarial training in building a robust system, there are three major practical difficulties while implementing and deploying this method. Difficulty one: adversarial training is expensive in terms of memory and computation costs. Producing an adversarial example requires multiple gradient computations. In a practical scenario, we further produce more than one adversarial examples for each clean example (Tramèr et al., 2017) . We need to at least double the amount of memory, to store (Di et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2019; Stanforth et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019) . (Di et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2019) . The cause of difficulty three: even though one might have sufficient computation resources and can afford training on both clean and adversarial examples, the finite amount of adversarial examples still limits the diversity of adversarial perturbations. Thus, the lack of diversity of adversarial perturbations decreases test accuracy on both clean and adversarial examples (Tramèr et al., 2017) .
Here, we introduce a new adversarial perturbation bias (δ AP ) to the last few fully connected layers of the deep convolutional network, replacing the normal bias term (Fig. 1c ). The main novelty is that instead of using a fixed, precomputed adversarial perturbations in adversarial examples (input space), we introduce dynamic adversarial perturbations into the parameter space of the network, lying inside the adversarial perturbation bias. During training on clean examples, the adversarial perturbation bias automatically creates and stores adversarial perturbations by recycling the gradient information computed and through updating using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. 
Where x cln is a clean example with true class y, θ is the network parameters, δ AP is adversarial perturbation bias, and L is the classification loss function. Both adversarial perturbations in adversarial examples and in adversarial perturbation biases are calculated using FGSM. The only difference is that adversarial perturbations in adversarial examples lie inside the input space and adversarial perturbations in adversarial perturbation bias lie inside the parameter space. Thus, the adversarial perturbation biases play a role like adversarial examples in the input space, but they can inject the learned adversarial perturbations directly to the network parameter space. Then, the network learns and adjusts itself automatically to these injected adversarial perturbations. Thus, it is a robust system against adversarial attacks. During training only on clean examples, the network with adversarial perturbation bias shows largely improved test accuracy on adversarial examples, with negligible extra costs. In addition, during classical adversarial training combined with our approach, the network with adversarial perturbation bias can alleviate the accuracy trade-off and diversify available adversarial perturbations. To show the efficacy of the network with adversarial perturbation bias on the above three difficulties, we consider three different scenarios that correspond to different abilities to access increasing computation power.
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Attack models and algorithms: Most of the attack models and algorithms focus on causing misclassification of target classifiers. They find an adversarial perturbation δ I . Then, they create an adversarial example by adding the adversarial perturbation to a clean example x cln : x adv = x cln + δ I . The adversarial perturbation sneaks the clean example x cln out of its natural class and into another. Given a fixed classifier with parameters θ, a clean example x cln with true label y, and a classification loss function L, the bounded non-targeted adversarial perturbation δ I is computed by solving:
where ||.|| p is some l p -norm distance metric, and is the adversarial perturbation budget.
In this work, we consider the most popular non-targeted method -Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. (2014) , in the context of l ∞ -bounded attacks:
White box attack model: In white box attacks (Qiu et al., 2019) , the adversaries have complete knowledge about the target model, including algorithm, data distribution and model parameters. The adversaries can generate adversarial perturbations by identifying the most vulnerable feature space of the target model. In this work, we use white box Fast Gradient Sign Method with = 0.3 to generate adversarial perturbations.
Modification of bias terms: Modifying the structure of bias terms in the fully connected layer can be beneficial. Wen & Itti (2019) used bias units to store the beneficial perturbations (opposite to the well-known adversarial perturbations). Wen & Itti (2019) showed that the beneficial perturbations, stored inside task-dependent bias units, can bias the network outputs toward the correct classification region for each task, allowing a single neural network to have multiple input to output mappings. Multiple input to output mappings alleviate the catastrophic forgetting problem (McCloskey & Cohen, 1989) in sequential learning scenarios (a previously learned mapping of an old task is erased during learning of a new mapping for a new task). Here, we leverage a similar idea. During training on clean examples, adversarial perturbation bias automatically creates and stores the adversarial perturbations. The network automatically learns how to adjust to these adversarial perturbations. Thus, it helps us to build a robust model against adversarial examples.
NETWORK STRUCTURE AND ALGORITHM FOR A NEURAL NETWORK WITH

ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION BIAS.
Two different structures for adversarial perturbation bias: naive adversarial perturbation bias and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias. Naive adversarial perturbation bias (δ AP ) is just a normal bias term of the fully connected layer. The only difference is that during backpropagation, we update the naive adversarial perturbation bias using the Fast Gradient Sign Method. For multimodal adversarial perturbation bias, we design the multimodal adversarial perturbation bias (δ AP = m AP W AP ) as a product of bias memories (m AP ∈ R 1×h ) and bias weight (W AP ∈ R h×n ), where n is the number of neurons in the fully connected layer, and h the number of bias memories. Multimodal adversarial perturbation bias has more degrees of freedom to better fit a multimodal distribution. Thus it could yield better results than the naive adversarial perturbation bias. The update rules for the network with naive (blue) and multimodal (red) adversarial perturbation bias are shown in Alg. 1 and Alg. 2.
Algorithm 1 Forward rules for both naive and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias Input: X activations -Activations from the last layer δ AP -Adversarial perturbation bias Output: Y = W X activations +δ AP , where: W -Normal neuron weights.
Algorithm 2 Backward rules for naive and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias Notations: W -Normal neuron weights X activations -Activations from the last layer δ AP -Adversarial perturbation bias (native or multimodal) m AP -Bias memories for multimodal adversarial perturbation bias W AP -Bias weights for multimodal adversarial perturbation bias -Adversarial perturbation budgets for Fast Gradient Sign Method
During the training: Input: Grad -Gradients from the next layer output: dW = Grad.dot(dX T activations ) // gradients for the normal neuron weights dX activations = W T .dot(Grad) // gradients for activations to last layer For naive adversarial perturbation bias:
dδ AP = sign( number of samples n=1
Grad) // gradients for the naive adversarial perturbation bias using FGSM For multimodal adversarial perturbation bias:
dm AP = sign (W T AP .dot(Grad)) // gradients for the bias memories of multimodal adversarial perturbation bias using FGSM dW AP = Grad.dot(m T AP ) // gradients for the bias weights of multimodal adversarial perturbation bias Adversarial perturbation budgets: The higher the adversarial perturbation budgets, the higher the chance it can successfully attack a neural network. However, attacks with higher adversarial perturbation budgets are easier to detect by a program or by humans. For example, = 0.3 ( Fig. 1a ) represents very high noise, which makes FashionMNIST images difficult to classify, even by humans. But the distribution differences between the adversarial examples and clean examples are so large that they can be easily captured by defense programs. Thus, ≤ 0.15 is a good attack since the differences caused by adversarial perturbations are too small to be detected by most defense programs. For small adversarial perturbations (Fig. 3a ≤ 0.15 ), by just training on clean images, LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias achieves moderate robustness against adversarial examples with negligible costs. Thus, it is really beneficial to adapt our method for companies with modest computation power, who still want to achieve moderate robustness against adversarial examples. Structure of adversarial perturbation bias: under the FGSM attacks ( = 0.3, Fig. 3b ), multimodal adversarial perturbation bias works better than naive perturbation bias on MNIST. However, naive adversarial perturbation bias works better than multimodal perturbation bias on FashionMNIST. Thus, the structure of adversarial perturbation bias is a hyperparameter for different datasets. The number of bias memories of multimodal adversarial perturbation bias is another hyperparameter. If we have insufficient bias memories, there is not enough degrees of freedom to learn a good multimodal distribution. If we have excessive bias memories, the model overfits the multimodal distribution. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new method to solve the three major practical difficulties while implementing and deploying adversarial training, by embedding adversarial perturbation into the parameter space (adversarial perturbation bias) of neural network. There are three major contributions that benefit for companies with different levels of computation resources - 
